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FOREWORD
STRAIGHTENING IT OUT: JOAN WILLIAMS
ON UNBENDING GENDER
ADRIENNE D. DAVIS∗
As most men and women acknowledge, gender is a battleground.
Most of us are fairly clear on biological sex: who bears children, who
ejaculates sperm, even whose (big) hands might open a stuck jar and
whose (smaller ones) could pull that cufflink out of the garbage
disposal.1 What remains less clear is how social gender roles flow
from this: Does lactation result in eighteen years of primary caregiving?2 Should the chemical realities of testosterone shape the law
∗
Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of Law. At the time of this
Symposium, I was Professor of Law and Co-Director of the Gender, Work & Family
Project, American University, Washington College of Law. The Symposium was cosponsored by the Gender, Work & Family Project and the American University Law
Review. I’d like to thank the Law Review, which provided expert research and
administrative support, as well as lending much-appreciated creativity and
enthusiasm. Frankie Winchester and Sharon Wolfe offered their usual invaluable
planning, graphic, coordination skills, including (and most valuably) daily crisis
management, advice, and friendship. The Project’s research assistants, Stephanie
Rainey and Julia Miller, were energetic and diligent in helping to plan the event.
WCL students Carolyn Pitt-Jones, Nadine Stocklin, and Sheryl Kaye and UNC student
Keischa Lovelace did painstaking work editing the transcript of my remarks and this
Foreword. Comments from Leti Volpp, who served as conference reporter, were very
helpful. Finally, I’d like to thank my co-director and colleague, Joan Williams, for
her feminist friendship in developing the Gender, Work & Family Project over the
last two years, and throughout my time at American University.
1. Some theorists argue that the organization of sex around such characteristics
is itself a social construction. They argue that gender so infiltrates our minds that it
affects our understanding even of biology. See generally JUDITH BUTLER, BODIES T HAT
M ATTER: ON THE DISCURSIVE LIMITS OF SEX (1993); see also Katherine M. Franke,
Putting Sex to Work, 75 DENV. U. L. REV. 1139 (1998) (arguing that a similar process is
at work in denoting something as “sexual”).
2. I don’t have biological (or any) children, but from what I understand, the
nine months of pregnancy and concluding labor and breast feeding could warrant
an opposite conclusion: the birth parent has done her part and the next ten years
are the primary responsibility of the non-birthing spouse.
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governing sexual assault?3 Should the dynamics of heterosexual
relationships mirror the physics of heterosexual intercourse
(penetration equals power)?4 Does the reality of the menstrual cycle
mean that women shouldn’t engage in public life? Of course I am
being somewhat flip in choosing examples that have long since been
resolved by most thinking people in our culture, but we all, young
and old, white and non-white, queer and straight, know that gender is
serious and contested business requiring a gentle touch.
With my colleague at the Washington College of Law (“WCL”),
Joan Williams, I have plunged head-first into these gender wars, but
engaging on a new front. Since the 1980s, gender has been
excellently theorized through the sex/violence axis.5 Theorists and
activists have shown how men as a group benefit from sexual
violence, and how the eroticization of sexual violence is a key part of
its normativity. In 1998, Joan and I created the Gender, Work &
3. Feminists and thoughtful lawmakers thought this had been shut down along
with the argument that hormones make some people violent so the law of assault
must permit them to hit others. However, this year it was resurrected with the
appearance of a new book arguing the evolutionary biological bases of rape. See
RANDY THORNHILL & CRAIG T. PALMER, N ATURAL HISTORY OF RAPE : BIOLOGICAL BASES
OF SEXUAL C OERCION (2000). Compare Jerry A. Coyne, Of Vice and Men, THE NEW
REPUBLIC, Apr. 3, 2000, at 27 (reviewing RANDY THORNHILL & CRAIG T. PALMER,
NATURAL HISTORY OF RAPE: BIOLOGICAL BASES OF SEXUAL C OERCION and criticizing the
book as dealing in dogmas, not specific propositions), and Barbara Ehrenreich, How
“Natural” Is Rape?, T IME, Jan. 31, 2000, at 88 (discussing Thornhill and Palmer
theories on rape), with Kenan Malik, Evolutionists Behaving Badly, FIN. T IMES, Mar. 18,
2000, at 4.
4. Some have argued that representing intercourse as “penetration” is itself a
linguistic capitulation to male power. They’ve suggested that alternative
understandings of the sex act, such as enclosure, could alter cultural understandings
of heterosexual sex. See generally M ARY BECKER ET AL., FEMINIST J URISPRUDENCE:
TAKING W OMEN SERIOUSLY 163-64 (1994); ANDREA DWORKIN, INTERCOURSE (1987).
5. For the past two decades, with rigor and profound social commitment,
feminist jurisprudence has conducted a rigorous and sustained inquiry into how
rape, sexual harassment, domestic violence, and pornography subordinate women.
Scholars in this field have skillfully linked the production of sexual norms of desire,
sexuality, and attraction to the production of gender; that is, what it means to be a
man or a woman in our culture. These feminists have shown how the eroticization of
dominance systematically empowers men, while subordinating women and
endangering their lives and bodily integrity. This inquiry into what might be called
the sex/violence axis of gender formation has been elegantly, if contentiously,
theorized, at times with stunning brilliance. Joan and I describe the sex/violence
axis in Adrienne D. Davis & Joan C. Williams, Foreword—Gender, Work & Family Project
Inaugural Feminist Legal Theory Lecture, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER, SOC. P OL’ Y & L. 1 (2000).
The most well-known and influential of these feminists is, of course, Catharine
MacKinnon. Her development of dominance theory effected one the most
significant paradigm shifts in feminist legal theory. Showing how dominance is
eroticized, she has argued for reform of harassment, rape, and pornography law. See
generally CATHARINE A. MAC KINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCUSSIONS ON L IFE AND
LAW (1987); C ATHARINE A. M ACKINNON, T OWARDS A FEMINIST T HEORY OF THE STATE
(1989); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward a
Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 635 (1983).
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Family Project at WCL to confront gender on the battleground of its
economic meanings. Our goal is to expose work/family conflict as in
need of the same theoretical attention and complex gender analysis
that has been brought to bear on the sex/violence system of gender
power. Increasingly, women are economically marginalized or
impoverished as they seek to balance their market work (paid) and
their family work (unpaid). The most dramatic instance of this is
when couples divorce and mothers and their children lose their
economic status while the children’s fathers do not. Reliance on a
male wage is increasingly normative as women are told that getting
and staying married is the best way to provide economically for their
children. The Gender, Work & Family Project incorporates the
gender theories generated by a variety of disciplines to offer a richer
understanding of the unyielding nature of mothers’ economic
marginalization.6 In the process, we uncover how gender is produced
through economic as well as sexual encounters.
This Symposium, “Unbending Gender: Why Work and Family
Conflict and What to Do About It,” co-sponsored with the American
University Law Review, is part of the Project’s effort to effect a
paradigm shift in how we view gender. It takes its title from my codirector’s recently published book, which focuses on the economic
meanings of gender, and gives special attention to how those
meanings are inflected by race and class.7 Joan Williams’ Unbending
Gender offers a concrete example of how the literature on gender as a
social construct exposes intricate and often masked family
negotiations between parental care and market work.8 For this
Symposium we adopted Williams’ book as a road-map and invited
scholars from diverse academic and activist backgrounds in gender
theory, labor law and family law, sociology, and tax law and policy to
consider the economic meanings of gender by approaching
work/family conflict as a site of intense gender production. What
follows in this issue is a transcript of the rich, and at times
6. For a description of the origins of the Gender, Work & Family Project
following the 1997 Critical Race Theory Conference at Yale, see Davis & Williams,
supra note 5.
7. JOAN W ILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK C ONFLICT AND
WHAT TO D O ABOUT IT (2000) [hereinafter UNBENDING GENDER]. For a thoughtful
review of UNBENDING GENDER, see Kathryn Abrams, Cross-Dressing in the Master’s
Clothes, 109 Y ALE L.J. 745 (2000) (book review).
8. One of the values of UNBENDING GENDER is that it brings together academic
dialogues that don’t happen enough: those who do critical theory and those who
generate hard data, feminism, and what I call market logic. Williams realizes that
much contemporary gender theory is often dense, and that its statistics are lifeless, so
she infuses her data with anecdotes, interviews, and popular cultural references, and
grounds her critical theory with policy implications.
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contentious, results.
In Unbending Gender, Williams identifies a three-step process by
which gender ideology creates and then mediates work/family
conflict to the economic detriment of women. First, gender norms
align masculinity with “the size of the paycheck” and femininity with
unpaid family work.9 Employers rely on these same gender norms in
designing workplaces that work for most men, but not for most
women. Parents with children will find it almost impossible to
perform ideally at the workplace and adhere to what Williams
identifies as the equally powerful norm of parental care.10 In
response to this (step two) mothers often economically marginalize
themselves, basing their decision on some combination of
considering their own paycheck as less essential than the father’s
because it is typically smaller; feeling guilty about being away from
their children; feeling anxiety about paying for child care as opposed
to providing it themselves; and getting frustrated from failed
negotiations with their partners over dividing family work.11 Society
offers a buffet of options for these women: part-time work, mommy
track jobs, and low-paying and dead-end pink collar positions that
offer more flexibility than more lucrative blue-collar work. Each
results in economic marginalization of a sort.12 The final cruel step
occurs if a woman divorces. Mothers often find themselves
impoverished, or otherwise economically vulnerable, as a result of
9. UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 7, at 25 (citing HARD-HATTED WOMEN:
STORIES OF STRUGGLES AND SUCCESS IN THE TRADES 195 (Molly Martin ed., 1988)).
10. UNBENDING GENDER does have a heterosexual emphasis. Early on Williams
explains:
[One] proviso concerns a lack of focus on gay families. This reflects the fact that
the literature on the gendering of gay families in still young. From talking with
divorce lawyers who specialize in gay partners, my sense is that many gay male
couples often play quite traditional gender roles. In sharp contrast, the growing
literature on lesbian parenting suggests that fewer lesbian couples track
domesticity’s gender roles than do other types of couples. . . . It is important to
remember that ideal workers and marginalized caregivers come in different body
shapes; gender roles are logically independent of sexual orientation.
UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 7, at 8-9.
11. Williams summarizes this as the current “domestic ecology that consists of
three elements: the gendered structure of market work, a gendered sense of how
much child care can be delegated, and gender pressures on men to structure their
identities around work.” See id. at 124.
12. See id. at 81-84. Williams notes that the “data suggest that, very conservatively,
at least two-thirds of the wage gap between men and women reflects women’s load of
family work. (This is not to deny that part of the remaining gap reflects good oldfashioned sex discrimination.).” See id. at 15 (using statistics by Professor Ureta from
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP’ T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT P OPULATION SURVEY
M ARCH SUPPLEMENT, PUBLIC USE FILES (1996) (footnote omitted)). “[O]ne study
found that women lose 1.5% of earning capacity for each year out of the labor
force.” Id. at 127 (citing Jacob Mincer & Solomon Polachek, Family Investments in
Humans Capital, in ECONOMICS OF THE FAMILY 397 (Theodore W. Shultz ed., 1974)).
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both their workforce marginalization while married, and an
unwillingness at divorce of judges to re-distribute what is viewed as
the father’s property. Judges do not recognize the mother’s
economic marginalization as a result of a family decision to distribute
market and family work to achieve mutual goals; instead, the
mother’s economic marginalization is viewed as a result of her
individual “choice.”13 Once framed in this way, the mother is viewed
as responsible for the consequences, including her own
impoverishment.
(Notably, “choosing” not to economically
marginalize offers a different “consequence.” Williams notes that
many women who refuse to economically marginalize themselves lose
custody of their children to their ex-husbands, even if he also worked
full time.)14 Within the realm of choice, there is no gender dynamic
to blame, no sex discrimination, no social responsibility for child
care, only individual women whose decisions to provide care for their
children in retrospect appear foolish in the cold harsh light of
divorce court.
Williams points out that all of this occurs against the backdrop of a
“first principle” of child care: the United States’ determination that
dependency should be supported within the family (meaning by
women). Our country offers fewer social subsidies than any other
industrialized nation.15 Feminists such as legal scholar Martha
Fineman and philosopher Eva Feder Kittay have developed strong
and persuasive critiques of this “first principle,” arguing that
supporting dependency is a public obligation.16 Fineman persuasively
argues that the emphasis of benefits and subsidies should be to
support bonds of dependency, rather than the sexual bond of two
independent adults.17 In Unbending Gender, Williams concurs that
“strong forces propel American families toward domesticity in a
society without publicly supported child care.”18 But if Fineman and
Kittay challenge and seek to redefine the external parameters of the
work/family debate (need, dependency, privacy), Williams re13. Essentially, this is socially understood, including by women themselves, as their
choice. See id. at 37-38.
14. See id. at 139-41.
15. See id. at 49.
16. See generally M ARTHA ALBERTSON F INEMAN, T HE NEUTERED M OTHER, THE SEXUAL
FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995); EVA FEDER KITTAY, LOVE’ S
LABOR: ESSAYS ON W OMEN, EQUALITY, AND DEPENDENCY (1999); Symposium, Gender,
Work & Family Project Symposium on Inaugural Feminist Legal Theory Lecture: “Cracking
the Foundational Myths,” 8 AM. U. J. GENDER, SOC. P OL’ Y & L. 1 (2000).
17. See Martha A. Fineman, Dependency and Social Debt: Making Caretaking Count
(unpublished manuscript, copy on file with author); see also Symposium, supra note
16.
18. UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 7, at 157.
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examines this debate within the context of the market, thereby
attempting to redefine its internal discursive structure.
One of the major contributions of Unbending Gender is its systematic
assault on liberalism’s retreat to choice. Williams correctly identifies
the rhetoric of choice as a major impediment to feminist reformation
of the work/family conflict.19 Because choices are essential to
liberalism’s ideals of autonomy and respect for the individual, legal
and popular culture declines to interrogate them.20 If women are
impoverished because they prefer lesser market work that enables
them to perform higher quality family work, then they must bear the
consequences of their actions, like any other bad deal.21 Choice
rhetoric erases the two prior steps in women’s economic
marginalization. It focuses attention instead on the final result,
viewed as a reflection of individual values and “tastes.”
The centrality of Williams’ critique of choice parallels the assault by
sex/violence feminists on the normativity of sexual desire. Within
the sex/violence system of gender power, much critical inquiry into
women’s sexual subordination was deflected by liberal
representations of sexuality as a matter of personal taste and
individual expression. “Desire” was incommensurable. Respect for
the individual shielded sexual practices from criticism about their
implications for social power. Within the work/family arena of
gender power, choice may operate as the economic equivalent of
desire. Like desire, it’s the show stopper, deflecting political critique.
Feminists working within the sex/violence system of gender power
have generated complex and diverse critiques of desire. In creating a
rich and intensely contested literature, feminists have rescued desire
19. However, choice is a central problematic in feminist theory because much of
the agenda of second-wave feminism was to enable women to be respected as agents
and autonomous of their husbands. With debates about abortion funding, day care,
welfare, domestic violence movements, etc., choice remains a core rhetoric in
feminist theory, ideology, and politics. One consideration is whether this means that
feminist theory remains intractably liberal. See sources cited infra note 20.
20. See generally Kathryn Abrams, From Autonomy to Agency: Feminist Perspectives on
Self-direction, 40 WM . & MARY L. REV. 805 (1999); Kathryn Abrams, Ideology and
Women’s Choices, 24 GA. L. REV. 761 (1990); Linda C. McClain, “Irresponsible”
Reproduction, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 339 (1996); Linda C. McClain, Reconstructive Tasks for a
Liberal Feminist Conception of Privacy, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 759 (1999); Joan C.
Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 M ICH. L. REV. 797 (1989).
21. In my first-year Contracts class, I teach Marvin v. Marvin, an early palimony
case based on implied contracts. 8 Cal. 3d 660 (1976) (appearing in RANDY E.
BARNETT, CONTRACTS: CASES AND D OCTRINES 636-47 (2d ed. 1999)). I am always
surprised by how many students, male and female alike, argue that because a
woman’s staying home is a “choice,” she must suffer any consequences stemming
from the decision. Given all of the casebook contracts doctrines that exist primarily
to salvage people from “bad deals,” it is intriguing that progressive students remain
in the grip of choice in the arena of the sexual family.
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from the banality of “tastes”; instead, desire has emerged as one of
the most theorized concepts in contemporary philosophy.
Paralleling her sisters’ efforts in the sex/violence gender system in
Unbending Gender, Williams deconstructs choice in the truly Derridean
sense. Unraveling the discourse of work/family, she finds the traces
of a complex system of gender ideology that has proved lethal for
mothers, not great for fathers, divided women, and sustained racial
and class divisions.
Williams’ work rests on her identification of a powerful norm
governing the American workplace.22 Employers expect and demand
what she calls “the ideal worker.” Such a worker can organize life to
accommodate the demands of employers. Williams draws compelling
portraits of how the demands imposed on the ideal worker vary in
blue- and white-collar contexts. In the former, the work ideal
includes overtime and flexibility regarding shifts, including swing
shifts. In more professional contexts, ideal workers are available to
travel on short notice and work sixty and even eighty hour weeks,
including early mornings, evenings, and weekends. In neither
workplace does the ideal worker take time off for childbearing or
lactation. Nor does such a worker take sick children to the doctor,
leave work at three o’clock in the afternoon to drive a child to ballet,
or take phone calls during meetings because this worker is the babysitter’s initial point of contact. The ideal worker can arrive at work at
7 a.m. and not leave until 8 p.m., even if that means leaving home
when children are still asleep and returning when they are on their
way to bed. In other words, this worker does not have primary or
even equally shared responsibility for dependents. This worker is
hopelessly gendered—it goes without saying—as male.
No doubt many men reading this description of market work recoil
from it and reject their embodiment of such “ideal workers.” They
are not, nor do they wish to be. Indeed, early in Unbending Gender,
Williams points out that the primary beneficiaries of the ideal worker
are employers; increasingly fathers no more than mothers (and
childless men no more than childless women) want to be confined to
“gray lives of hard labor.”23 Yet her most devastating critique is to
22. UNBENDING GENDER is mainly an analysis of work/family conflict and gender
performance in the United States. Some parts are comparative, in particular,
contrasts between European and American subsidies for child care and a
consideration of Latin American feminist rhetoric. See UNBENDING GENDER, supra
note 7, at 49, 51, 100, 232-33, 235, 236, 238-39, 240.
23. See id. at 59. Hours required in the work week have been steadily increasing
in both the blue- and white-collar contexts. See id. at 50-51. One interesting British
study found that “employers build gender into the way they structure hours: in male
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show how it is overwhelmingly men who embody the ideal worker.
First, the ideal worker is not burdened by a proportionate share (say
fifty percent) of family work.24 Second, and crucially, the ideal worker
is actually supported by the family work done by another adult. This
distinction proves essential to why, although not all men can, do, or
seek to perform as ideal workers, overwhelmingly it is only men who
are capable of doing so (a crucial point in the liberal realm of
choice). While some women can avoid primary responsibility for
dependents, either by remaining childless or by finding a mate
willing to share family work, the great majority of women cannot
access the flow of domestic labor so crucial to performing as an ideal
worker.
In jobs structured around a flow of family work men have but
women don’t, women must choose between work and family while
men can have both. Nine out of ten men in upper-level corporate
management have children and a nonworking spouse. As Deborah
Rhode has pointed out, most female executives have neither.
Almost one-third of women in senior positions, but only 6 to 8
percent of men, never marry. Only about 30 percent of women in
senior positions have children, as compared to 90 percent of men.
Ninety-three percent of married women lawyers have spouses who
work full time, a disproportionate number of them as high-level
professionals; these husbands do not provide their wives with the
flow of family work available to the nearly half of married male
attorneys who are married to housewives. Female executives also
tend to be married to same-class males who work full time, but the
men are often married to homemakers. A recent DuPont study
found that its male executives are now more likely to have an at25
home wife than they were ten years ago.

Students are often stunned when I share these realities in discussions
of marital property and Feminist Jurisprudence. But if some male
students are alarmed by these statistics, women students find these
prospects utterly chilling. Most young women in law school have
always been peers with male classmates. Yet, given their selfarticulated goals of marrying other professional males, they confront
the fact that their professional futures as mothers will almost certainly
be different from their male classmates’ economic futures as fathers.26
jobs, they achieve flexibility through overtime; in female ones, they do so through
part-time work.” Id. at 82 (citing T. BEECHEY, A MATTER OF H OURS: W OMEN, P ARTTIME WORK AND THE LABOUR M ARKETS (1987)).
24. “[T]he ideal worker is defined as someone with immunity from family work.”
Id. at 24.
25. Id. at 72-73 (footnote omitted).
26. Interestingly, a much higher proportion of male students express openness
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Unbending Gender argues a persuasive case for the proposition that, as
long as workplaces are organized around employers’ demands for
men’s bodies and social capacities, the ideal worker inevitably will
remain a gendered creature.27 “The result is a dominant domestic
ecology that enhances men’s market potential while eroding
women’s. Fathers earn 10 to 15 percent more than men without
children, while mothers earn 10 to 15 percent less than women
without them.”28 With her revelation of the ideal worker, Williams
strongly suggests that mothers’ marginalization is not the result of
their individual choices, but rather workplace norms that she argues
constitute illegal discrimination against women.29
Williams also uncovers traces of the ideal worker norm in family
law. When mothers do part-time work, leave partnership track for
mommy track, or seek lower paying service jobs over blue-collar ones,
they often do so after a period of trying to balance market and family
work. Sometimes mothers’ leaving/marginalizing results from joint
decisions with their husbands to maximize family income with male
earning power while sustaining a mutually desired quality of child
care.30 But Williams’ research shows that women’s decisions are
neither mutual nor explicit:
I have found that when mothers quit, they often say that it was
because “it just wasn’t working”: everyone was grumpy and rushed,
there never seemed to be anything clean to wear or anything for
dinner, every childhood illness created a family crisis of who would
miss work. Not that many of these things related to family work.
When a mother stays home “because it just wasn’t working,” she
(although typically not preference at our very feminist school) to having a wife stay at
home than female students indicate that they would desire a stay-at-home mate.
Rhona Mahony argues that this is an essential dynamic to women’s economic
marginalization. See generally RHONA M AHONY, JUST KIDDING O URSELVES:
BREADWINNING, BABIES, AND BARGAINING P OWER (1995).
27. Williams explains how
the mechanisms of exclusion from blue-collar jobs differ from those in whitecollar work. Whereas women typically have little trouble stepping onto the job
ladders for managerial and professional positions, typically they are excluded up
front from blue-collar positions by three types of masculine norms: equipment
and industrial processes designed around men’s bodies, schedules designed
around men’s access to a flow of family work from women, and eligibility for the
jobs defined in terms of masculine gender performance.
UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 7, at 76.
28. Id. at 125. Children can be seen as almost a proxy for access to family work.
29. “Employers discriminate against women when they structure work to require
employees not only to be competent but also to have gender privileges typically
available only to men.” Id. at 76.
30. “The sense that child rearing demands a mother’s presence reflects, in part,
the very practical point that children can miss out on important learning and social
opportunities if their mothers as well as their fathers perform as ideal workers.” Id.
at 34.
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avoids the increased level of conflict often found in households
where men are required to do significant amounts of domestic
work. Instead, her husband receives the clean clothes, meals, and
childcare required to support his ability to perform as an ideal
31
worker.

Whether it is an explicitly joint decision or an obscured resolution of
an unarticulated gender dynamic, women’s concern for child care
and the resulting workforce marginalization finds strong cultural
support—until divorce. At that point, mothers often find their claims
to distribution of the marital estate measured against ideal worker
norms rather than caregiver norms.
In the average divorce the major family asset is future wages.32
Moreover the home is sold, either initially as part of the estate
distribution, or subsequently because of the mother’s inability to
meet mortgage payments on her own.33 Distribution of the family
wage then becomes crucial to each party’s economic future. Williams
unpacks how the ideal worker’s wage reflects the combination of
(his) market work and (her) family work.
The ideal-worker norm produces a wage gap not only between
mothers and others but also between men whose wives do market
work and men whose wives don’t. This gap reflects the fact that
although men with working wives do not share equally in family
work, they do considerably more than men whose wives stay at
home. This leaves the husbands of housewives free to ‘go the extra
34
mile’ at work.

Strikingly, Williams shows that this dynamic continues after the
divorce. “[I]n the nearly 90 percent of divorces where mothers retain

31. See id. at 33.
32. “Very few divorcing families have substantial property because most have
invested in the ideal-worker’s wage. One study found that the average family had
only $3,400 in savings upon divorce.” Id. at 129. Because of contemporary
demographics (mortgage structures and the relatively short amount of time people
remain married), there is typically little equity in the family home.
33.
Less affluent wives often find that ‘equal division’ means they have to sell the
family home so that the husband can get his equity out of it, while his children
and their mother move to an apartment or smaller home in a cheaper
neighborhood. One study found that two-thirds of the children of divorce move
to less affluent surroundings within three to five years after divorce. Thus
‘equality’ is imposed in contexts where that gives wives less than they would have
gotten under the old dependence-based fault system in which custodial mothers
typically were given the family home.
Where the estate is a substantial one, equality goes out the window. One study
found that three-fourths of wives in families where the husband owned a business
or professional license received less than half of the family assets.
Id. at 121 (footnote omitted).
34. See id. at 59.
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custody, the father continues to be supported by a flow of family work
from the mother of his children even if she is not his wife.”35 Yet,
despite statutes to the contrary, courts distribute future income
disproportionately to the ideal worker husband.
Williams links their outcome to liberal legal theory which she
argues is susceptible to the ideal worker norm. A defining
characteristic of Anglo-American property ideology is the distinction
between claims that stem from entitlements and claims that do not.
The ideal worker is able to articulate his claims to the income in
language that resonates with entitlements and property rights. He
projects the income stream as a reflection of his compensated work in
the market. The income paid to the ideal worker for market work is
construed by courts as “owned” by him. In contrast, because her
claims are now being measured against a standard she does not
embody (the ideal worker), caregiving mothers find it difficult to
access the language of rights. In a system that measures work against
wages, caregiving mothers find it difficult to show how their
uncompensated family work supported the family wage. The value of
her family work disappears, as does her apparent entitlement to the
wage. Deprived of the language of market work and property
entitlements, mothers often end up defending their claims in the
language of need. Her claims to distribution are represented as
charitable ones.36 Williams identifies this as a critical rhetorical shift
with devastating material consequences.
The result is a system that places men’s claims in the
nondiscretionary realm of property, while it relegates women’s and
children’s claims to the discretionary realm of family law. This
means that women’s and children’s claims are dependent on
courts’ willingness to redistribute a man’s property.
Given
Americans’ reluctance to redistribute wealth, this gendered
37
allocation places women and children at a severe disadvantage.

Although the ideal worker’s wage was, and will continue to be, the
product of two adults, courts award it to only one.38 At this stage,
choice delivers the final blow. Many divorced mothers find
35. Id. at 9. Significantly, Williams notes this is also true “[i]n virtually all families
headed by never married mothers.” Id. (emphasis added); see also id. at 126-27.
36. See id. at 120; see also Adrienne D. Davis, The Private Law of Race and Sex: An
Antebellum Perspective, 51 S TAN. L. REV. 221, 249-50 (1999) (examining rhetoric of
rights versus charity in claims made by formerly enslaved persons).
37. See UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 7, at 120.
38. “Thus, a wife is entitled to half an estate if that is necessary to meet her
reasonable needs. But she is not entitled to half if her needs can be met with less.”
Id. at 121. This preference for need-based assertions is reflected in alimony statutes.
See id. at 122.
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themselves blamed for what was once applauded when they were
married—their efforts to meet norms of parental care. What were
family decisions to distribute market and family work are reconstrued
as her choice. Accordingly, his economic future should not be
burdened by her prior choices.39 At divorce, as in the workplace,
women suffer economically for their inability to meet the ideal
worker standard.
In defining the ideal worker norm, Unbending Gender exemplifies
rich uses of gender theory. It offers a satisfying and grounded
account of how the ideal worker is embodied as male. As she works
her way through immense piles of data, statistics, and anecdotes,
Williams identifies the contours of a complex gender ideology she
calls domesticity. She proffers domesticity as an essential tool in the
economic construction of gender. A standard feminist account of
nineteenth-century gender patterns holds that with industrialization
and urbanization men’s work increasingly moved out of the
household.40 This introduced a critical distinction between the paid
work that men now performed outside of the home and the
uncompensated work that women continued in the household.
Moreover, with the rise of a market for consumer goods, women
decreasingly produced the actual goods used in the household.
Women found their work increasingly invisible as such. Williams
shows that this physical and demographic shift was accompanied by a
39. “Courts typically do not require husbands to pay alimony in amounts that
would diminish the husband’s lifestyle.” Id. at 122. Williams identifies another
powerful rhetoric at work in women’s marginalization: the idea of the “clean break.”
“A central thrust of the no-fault revolution was to introduce the view that divorce was
simply the unfortunate break-down of a love relationship; once the marriage was
dead, both parties should be free to make a ‘clean break’ and a ‘fresh start.’” Id. at
127. But Williams argues “[m]others have always understood that having children
decreases future freedom. Fathers need to learn the same lesson. Mothers never
have had the option of disinvesting in existing children in favor of having new ones.
Offering this option to fathers seems equally bizarre.” Id. at 127 (footnote omitted).
40.
We tend to think of [the breadwinner/homemaker dyad] as the traditional
family, but that is a misnomer. Before the nineteenth century, it would have
made no sense to think of a breadwinner, with its connotation of someone who
leaves the house to work for money. Inhabitants of small family farms throughout
the country, and of the great plantations of the South, raised much of their own
food. They produced not only their own bread but the yeast to raise it; made not
only their own clothing but the thread to sew it; not only washed the clothes but
produced soap and starch for laundering.
In this context both parents “stayed home,” but neither focused primarily on
child care. To keep a household fed, shod, healthy, and housed required the fulltime work of both parents—and of the children as well. Apart from a very small
elite, men, women, children, apprentices, and servants worked side by side to
produce much of what they needed to live.
Id. at 20 (citing JEANNE B OYDSTON, H OME AND WORK 10-20 (1990)).

FOREWORDPP. DOC

2000]

6/18/2001 12:11 PM

FOREWORD

835

new gender ideology:
Domesticity introduced not only a new structuring of market work
and family work but also a new description of men and women.
The ideology of domesticity held that men “naturally” belong in
the market because they are competitive and aggressive; women
belong in the home because of their “natural” focus on
relationships, children, and an ethic of care. In its original
context, domesticity’s descriptions of men and women served to
justify and reproduce its bread winner/housewife roles by
establishing norms that identified successful gender performance
41
with character traits suitable for these roles.

Like many feminists, I had (blissfully) relegated the cult of
domesticity to the nineteenth century. However, Unbending Gender
reveals its on-going normative power. Many of us are often somewhat
perplexed by the continued grip of conventional masculinity and
femininity in our culture. As Williams points out, “[f]eminists sorely
need a theory of conventionality.”42 Domesticity offers one.
Domesticity associates masculinity with earning power outside of
the home, and femininity with the unpaid provision of care within
the home.43 Many men as well as women would prefer the “daddy
track,” but fear loss of masculine identity.44
A recent literature review concluded “[v]irtually all men believe
that being a good father means first and foremost being a good
provider.” [One] study of dual-earner families found that both
men and women attach different meanings to the employment of
wives than to the employment of husbands. Reports from men
indicated that, even when their wives were employed, they still felt
45
a special obligation to provide.

Domesticity’s ideal of a breadwinner/homemaker dyad increasingly is
unavailable for most families. Yet it remains normative. For instance,
a recent study found that
most women (83 percent of women and even higher a percentage
of child rearing mothers) felt their husbands should be the primary
providers (even when economic circumstances made this
41. See id. at 1 (citing NANCY C OTT, T HE BONDS OF WOMANHOOD 63 (1977)).
Williams notes that the cult of domesticity was more of an ideological construct than
a sociological description. It was widely aspirational though, far beyond its
descriptive power. See id.
42. Id. at 246.
43. This understanding of masculinity illustrates gender’s economic as well as
erotic dimensions.
44. “[T]he association of masculinity with breadwinning, so that manhood
became contingent on success in market work, was a sharp shift whose significance is
often underestimated.” Id. at 25.
45. Id. at 27 (citing JEAN L. P OTUCHEK, W HO SUPPORTS THE FAMILY? 4 (1997)).
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impossible) or had husbands who were primary providers (even
when they regretted this). In other words, even among women
who work, few are breadwinners. The data linking men with
breadwinning are even more dramatic. Roughly three-fourths of
men in dual-earner families either performed as breadwinners or
46
wished they could. Those who didn’t included few fathers.

Meanwhile, contemporary women continue down the paths of their
nineteenth century sisters—to leave or to cut back on market work in
order to work for the home. Although most women do market work,
it has not come to define femininity in the ways it continues to define
masculinity. “A 1995 study found that 88 percent of the women
surveyed believed it was their primary responsibility to take care of
the family.”47 Women describe themselves as homemakers, even
when they do market work.48 For many women (and their men), the
breadwinner/homemaker dyad remains aspirational, if not
descriptive.
Domesticity supports and coerces men’s market work. It associates
(conventional) masculine identity with the economic sphere. But why
doesn’t domesticity also economically value women’s domestic work,
so crucial to their families and society?49 Why is it that market work
yields economic entitlements and family work does not so that at
divorce, “a wife is entitled to half an estate if that is necessary to meet
her reasonable needs,” but “she is not entitled to half if her needs can
be met with less.”?50 Williams shows how domesticity erases women’s
family work as work and engenders it as noncompensable. Efforts to
challenge this construction trigger what Williams labels
“commodification anxiety.”51 Unbending Gender identifies two ways this
46. Id. at 27. Williams also cites Ellen Israel Rosen’s 1987 study in which bluecollar women articulated their market work as “helping their husbands” so that the
men could continue to believe they were the primary breadwinner. See id. at 28.
47. Id. at 31 (citing NANCY LEVIT , THE GENDER LINE 33 (1998)).
48.
[T]he most common approach among employed wives was the employed
homemaker, who does not see her job as occupying a central role in the lives of her
family and sees her husband as the breadwinner. In only 20 percent of the dualearner couples studied did the women consider themselves co-breadwinners or
committed workers; these women were also less likely to have children at home.
Id. at 27 (citing JEAN L. POTUCHEK, W HO SUPPORTS THE FAMILY? 45-48 (1997)).
49. “Credible estimates place the value of unpaid family work at between 20 and
60 percent of gross national product.” See id. at 120.
50. Id. at 121; see also supra notes 32-39 (discussing the way in which property is
divided during divorce proceedings and concluding that husbands are awarded the
bulk of the property at issue).
51. There is a rich and complex debate on commodification. Williams notes that
“[c]ommodification anxiety serves several different purposes and does not always
signal the policing of gender boundaries. But it often does, in ways that rarely have
been recognized.” UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 7, at 118.

FOREWORDPP. DOC

2000]

6/18/2001 12:11 PM

FOREWORD

837

anxiety manifested through domesticity: the logic of the separate
spheres and emerging class pressures.
Williams establishes how the separate spheres imagery replaced
coverture in delineating power between men and women. Coverture
established married couples as a single legal and economic unit,
which was headed by the husband. He was entitled to her property
and her labor, both justified in explicitly hierarchical terms. But in
the nineteenth century,
[w]ith the shift away from open hierarchy to new imagery of men
and women sovereign in their separate spheres, the fact that men
still owned the right to their wives’ services became a fact that
needed to be explained. The solution . . . was the ‘pastoralization’
of women’s work, its depiction as the ‘effortless emanations of
women’s very being.’ The notion that women’s spinning, weaving,
sewing, soap and candle making, laundering, gardening, livestock
tending, cooking, canning, and child rearing were not really work
eliminated the need to explain why men still owned the right to
52
such services.

Women’s family work was as important as men’s market work, but
they were essentially different, justifying compensation of one but not
the other.53 Separate spheres imagery represented the home as the
antithesis of the market.54 In the separate spheres model, homes
were havens from grubby markets and women keepers of civic
virtue.55 The economic rewards of market work were replaced with
representations of family work as service to the nation. “Turning
labor into love preserved men’s traditional access to women’s work by
arguing that any attempt to link such work with entitlements would
sully the home sweet home with market values of a ‘selfish and

52. Id. at 32-33 (citing JEANNE BOYDSTON, HOME AND W ORK 158 (1990)). The
erasure of household work “defuse[d] the tension between the ideology of equality
and the persistence of male entitlements originally described in the language of
gender hierarchy.” Id. at 33.
53. “Whereas in classical republican thought virtue referred to the manly pursuit
of the common good in the public sphere, under domesticity the preservation of the
republic was thought to depend on the success of women in raising the next
generation of citizens in the domestic sphere.” Id. at 4.
54.
The separation of home and work is a central tenet of domesticity. The physical
separation of work and home life came about in the nineteenth-century
commercial and industrial economy by separating market work from family work
both geographically (into factories) and temporally (into a preset “workday” in
sharp contrast to earlier patterns, which interspersed work and family life.
Id. at 31.
55. “Domesticity created a symbolic world that divided into a private sphere of
selfless women and public sphere of market actors pursuing their own self-interest.”
Id.
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calculating world.’”56 Women’s work could not be commodified lest
the home fall ill to market norms. What had been viewed for
centuries as productive work essential to sustaining an agricultural
household was represented as a labor of love, or even denied to exist.
Williams also shows how emerging class pressures joined the
rhetoric of gendered virtue and service to the nation in normalizing
uncompensated mother care.57 She points out that children had
longed been raised by adults who were not their parents, relatives and
servants.58 But as the class structure shifted, families became more
concerned about market-provided childcare.
Mothers stayed home both to signal class directly, for “ladies” did
not work, and to transmit middle-class status to their children. This
was part of an important shift in the organization of class. So long
as this remained true, upper-class parents felt they could rely on
servants to raise their young, because the crucial education
consisted of class-appropriate decorum. That, and money, ensured
that children would step into their parents’ social position. With
the rise of the middle class, in sharp contrast, class status depended
on parents’ ability to transmit skills, because each generation had
to earn its living on its own. This engendered the “fear of falling”:
the fear among middle-class families that their children would not
develop the self-discipline and skills needed to gain personal access
to middle-class life . . . . Thus arose the sense that mothers should
59
care for their own children.

Domesticity became a central middle-class value; mothers found
themselves the buffer between children and class slippage.60 Under
these circumstances, market care could not be trusted to ensure
children’s futures.61 Williams argues that domesticity yielded the
56. Id. at 117 (footnote omitted).
57. Williams notes that today, while there is a rhetoric of distrust for child care,
within individual families fathers are more comfortable defying cultural norms and
delegating child care to the market than are mothers.
[W]hen mothers refuse to follow docilely in domesticity’s care-giver role, a game
of chicken emerges in which fathers advocate higher levels of delegation than
mothers consider appropriate. The classic example is the high-status father who
advocates hiring two sets of nannies to give sixteen hours of coverage so that no
one’s career is hurt.
Id. at 53. Elsewhere Williams speculates that “[b]ecause fathers delegated virtually all
of child care under traditional domesticity, many fathers retain a sense that virtually
all child care is delegable. Most mothers do not.” Id. at 124.
58. Williams describes Harriet Beecher Stowe’s upbringing. See id. at 20-21.
59. Id. at 35.
60. “Domesticity not only makes mothers the primary delivery system for services
to children; it also links access to middle-class status with conventional gender roles.”
Id. at 34.
61. “If child care is in the market, then it is consigned to the market realm,
where strangers pursue their own self-interest.” Id. at 32.
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same allocations as coverture. In both instances, it enabled men to
claim rights to their wives’ labor but in rhetoric consonant with
emerging norms of men and women as equals.62
Today, the ideology of gender equality is even stronger. And so,
not surprisingly, is commodification anxiety. Importing market
values into relations between family members (or at least husbands
and wives) continues to be repugnant. Williams detects modern day
commodification anxiety in recent divorce cases63 as well as in the rise
in rhetoric about fears of day care.64 Domesticity’s denial of family
work as (potentially compensable) work is even more critical.
Contemporary images erase family work through the rhetoric of
parental care. One can detect elements of both the separate spheres
and class anxiety in the following:
The notion that mothers’ family work is not “work” serves to gloss
over the fact that mothers at home not only care for the kids but
clean the shirts. When a wife stays home full or even part time, her
husband’s contributions to family work typically decrease. As a
result, husbands of homemakers earn more and get higher raises
than similarly educated men whose wives do no market work. But
women at home typically insist they are there to pay “rich
65
attention” to their children . . . not to do the housework.

Women as well as men have an investment in understanding
mothers’ economic marginalization as a result of personal “choices”
and priorities rather than conventional gender roles that continue to
preserve men’s rights to women’s family work.66
Domesticity is a key gender ideology that shapes women’s
economic relationships, whether they are doing work in the market,
62. See id. at 116.
63. See id. at 117-20.
64. See id. at 31-32. Later Williams notes:
[T]he imagery and reality of day care are different here than elsewhere. Where
child care is prevalent and government-sponsored, it is seen as an expression of
social solidarity and national investment in the next generation. In sharp
contrast, in the United States, day care is seen as an expression of the market.
Id. at 49. She points out, “If teachers are not strangers, why are caregivers?” Id. at 32.
65. Id. at 33 (footnote omitted); see also id. at 125 (reiterating that the family
work of wives allows husbands to concentrate more fully on market work, thereby
increasing their value in the work place).
66.
The men, of course, get even madder, for feminists are reopening conflicts where
men not only won the battle but the right to describe the war. For some outsider
to barge in and define their hard-won career as the result of gender privilege,
particularly when his own wife describes the situation as the result of her free
choice, is maddening, especially in a culture where one of the key gender
privileges men enjoy is the privilege of describing themselves as living in the most
equal of worlds.
Id. at 242.
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or at home.67 In theorizing the economics of gender, Williams shows
that the work/family system of power is not as susceptible to feminist
organizing and coalition-building as was the sex/violence system.
Unlike sexual violence, in domesticity women often do not
understand themselves to be victims or subordinated. Rape and
harassment are not attractive to any women; but domesticity is quite
seductive for many.68 And yet domesticity does not unite women
across class, race, and sexual orientation the way that sexual violence
does.69 Instead, Williams argues the opposite.
Domesticity’s
generation and resolution of work/family conflict exemplifies how
“gender unites men but divides women.”70 In the process, it also
feeds racial and class divides. Critically, both of these dynamics
alienate communities from feminism.71
Assault on domesticity was a core part of feminism in the early
1960s. As Betty Friedan and others envisioned it, women would gain
equality with men through market work.72 Importantly, Williams

67. Socialist feminists contend that the sexual division of labor is the precursor
and prerequisite to all other divisions of labor, thereby challenging the conventional
Marxist analysis of account of class struggle. See, e.g., Zillah Eisenstein, Constructing a
Theory of Capitalist Patriarchy and Socialist Feminism, in W OMEN, CLASS, AND THE
FEMINIST IMAGINATION 114, 114 (Karen V. Hansen & Ilene J. Philipson eds., 1990) (“It
becomes necessary to understand that patriarchy (as male supremacy) existed before
capitalism and continues in postcapitalist societies. And yet to say that, within the
present system of power, either patriarchy or capitalism causes the other is to fail to
understand their present mutually reinforcing system and dialectical
relationship . . . .”). For a more general description of socialist feminism see M ARY
BECKER ET AL., supra note 4, at 103-10.
68. See UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 7, at 18 (noting that 83% of women think
men should be breadwinners).
69. Of course class, race, and sexual orientation shape women’s relationship and
susceptibility to sexualized violence. See, e.g., ANGELA Y. DAVIS, W OMEN, RACE, &
CLASS 172-201 (1981) (analyzing the impact of racism on the issue of rape);
M ACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 5, at 217-18; Kimberle Crenshaw,
Mapping the Margins: Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN . L. REV. 1241 (1991)
(examining the race and gender aspects of violence against women); Leti Volpp,
Talking “Culture”: Gender, Race, Nation, and the Politics of Multiculturalism, 96 C OLUM.
L. REV. 1573 (1996) (arguing that refusing to consider race or culture in the legal
system will not result in fair “colorblind” justice). But overwhelmingly in the
sex/violence paradigm, women understand themselves to be disadvantaged by virtue
of their sex, although often complicated by other identity characteristics.
70. UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 7, at 7.
71. See, e.g., Crenshaw, supra note 69, at 1242-44 (explaining how women of color
are marginalized within the discourse of feminism, as well as the discourse of
racism).
72.
Friedan’s dream [was] of a professional job; her anger is that of a woman whose
gender has blocked her from claiming the job that otherwise would be hers by
virtue of her race and class. Gender has always seemed the most important axis of
social power for privileged white women because it is the only one that blocks
their way.
UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 7, at 152-53.
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argues that Friedan and others envisioned that women’s entrance
into the workforce would be part of broader structural shifts that
would lead to subsidized child care and shared allocations of market
and family work between men and women.73 Unfortunately, neither
came to pass. “[M]others’ entrance into the labor force has not been
accompanied by fathers’ equal participation in family work”74 and
“[t]he early feminist vision of two parents working forty-hour weeks
did not come to pass; neither did the vision of child-care centers
being as common and as respected as public libraries. What we have
instead . . . is an economy of mothers and others, where many fathers
work overtime and a majority of mothers are not ideal workers.”75
Those who continue to endorse Friedan’s strategy have adopted what
Williams calls the full-commodification strategy. They “delegate”
their childcare to the market (almost always to a woman of a lesser
class, and often different ethnicity).76 Williams argues that this fullcommodification of childcare does not challenge the essential
structure of domesticity and results in several conflicts.
First, not surprisingly, such a resolution pits ideal worker women
against caregiver women over the value of family work.77 Williams
describes “the mommy wars” as, increasingly, women are performing
as ideal workers.78 While most women fall somewhere in between the
poles of ideal worker women and mothers who do no compensated
work outside the house, “[t]hese infinite gradations are divisive, as
each woman judges women more work-centered than herself as
insensitive to her children’s needs, and those less work-centered as
having ‘dropped out’ or ‘given up.’”79 Many feminists have pointed
out how the market delegation solution remains insensitive to the
issue of who will care for the children of the child care workers. This
foments race and class divisions among women. But Unbending Gender
73. “Friedan strategically avoided issues such as child care in the beginning of
the sex-role revolution” but later sought structural changes in the workplace, the
home, the family, and marriage. Id. at 44-45.
74. Id. at 45.
75. Id. at 63. It does seem that they could have taken a cue from working-class
women of all colors about the unyielding nature of work/family conflict.
76. I am conscious here of how the language of delegation itself establishes a
“responsibility” with women that is then assigned to someone else. In this sense it
reinforces the image of child care and other family work as women’s obligation.
77. See id. at 145. “Domesticity’s organization of market work and family work
pits ideal-worker women against women who have made a conscious, often painful,
decision to reject the ideal-worker role in favor of a life defined by caregiving.” Id.
(footnote omitted).
78. See, e.g., id. at 146 (describing the anger of homemakers towards Hillary
Clinton when she defended her decision to pursue her career and made a comment
which seemed to devalue care-giving).
79. Id. at 147.
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offers a more complex synthesis of gender, race, and class. Its
analysis demonstrates the flaws in mainstream feminism’s embrace of
market solutions, which left domesticity intact.
Williams points out that market-provided childcare is unappealing
to working-class women (of all colors) because they cannot afford
consistent care of the quality they desire.80 The only hope for
working-class families to be able to offer the kind of childcare that
middle-class children enjoy is through mother care or parental care.
The full-commodification response to domesticity turns class
disenfranchisement into poor childcare for their children. It also
expresses the elitism of mainstream feminism. Williams asks:
Does the full-commodification model embed class privilege? Upon
reflection, it does. Its imagery of market work as liberating and of
domesticity as drudgery is framed around the kinds of jobs
available to women from the professional middle class. Its vision of
the market as a benign force that can enhance family life is one
most often held by women with enough wealth to gain access to
81
rewarding work and quality child care.

Many families of color experience a similar dynamic. The fear is that
children of color will experience overt racism and/or benign neglect
in market care. In a variation on working-class strategies, only
through parent care will a child of color be psychologically and
socially equipped to confront and withstand systemic racism. For
black families in particular, “[b]ecause one of the key expressions of
white supremacy, from slavery until today, is the assault on the black
family, African-Americans have often seen the preservation of family
life as a deeply important political goal.”82
For non-elite and non-white women, mainstream feminism’s
endorsement of full-commodification does not offer viable or
desirable solutions to their work/family conflict. In addition,
mothers in these communities may feel alienated from feminism’s
80. As Bonnie Thornton Dill describes in roundtable II, many black women in
rural areas have complex networks of relatives. See infra transcript of Panel II: Who’s
Minding the Baby? “In general, child care used by middle-class parents emphasizes
child development and learning opportunities, while working-class parents often can
afford only the most basic services from unlicensed providers.” UNBENDING GENDER,
supra note 7, at 154 (footnote omitted).
81. Id. at 150.
82. Id. at 165. For a more general description of the treatment of enslaved
families, see id. at 164-65. Based on this, Peggy Davis has argued for the constitutional
recognition of families. See PEGGY C OOPER DAVIS, NEGLECTED STORIES : THE
CONSTITUTION AND FAMILY VALUES 9 (1997) (drawing upon stories of individuals who
sponsored the Fourteenth Amendment to show that they viewed the rights of family
as a fundamental part of defining freedom and citizenship). Williams describes
similar insights by other women of color. See UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 7, at
167-68.
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criticism of the nuclear family. Families in marginalized communities
are often havens from demeaning class dynamics and/or racism. The
feminist endorsement of ideal worker strategies and market solutions
does not take full account of the race and class dimensions of
domesticity. And with its recommendation for women to leave family
work to the market, the full-commodification model may appear to
devalue such work, alienating caregiving women of all backgrounds.83
Instead of being unified, women can be deeply divided by their
relationship to domesticity and market-based solutions. So can men.
By associating masculinity with breadwinner status, the norm of
domesticity has devastated working class and non-white men. Part of
what enabled working-class men to be in solidarity with elite white
men (as opposed to men of color who shared their class interests)
was that they could embody the dominant cultural image of
masculinity. Williams reminds us that
[f]or a short period after World War II, working-class men in good
blue-collar jobs could deliver the “good life”—the house, the car,
the washing machine—on their salaries alone, or with only
intermittent, part-time work from their wives. Those days are gone.
The family wage today is what it was originally: a prerogative of the
84
middle class.

Many can no longer find “ideal worker” jobs, and for those who can,
the economic rewards are not what they once were.85 Unfortunately,
the bitter residue of class disfranchisement has often been digested as
anger against people of color and women for “taking their jobs.”86
Although some of these men publicly express frustration as
opposition to affirmative action or xenophobia, Unbending Gender
argues that they privately understand their class disfranchisement
through racialized gender disfranchisement.
“I know she doesn’t mind working, but it shouldn’t have to be that
way,” said Doug, [a] white thirty-year-old forklift operator. “A guy
83. “In the popular imagination, feminism still is linked with the glorification of
market work and the devaluation of family work.” Id. at 41.
84. Id. at 153.
85.
Blue-collar males have seen their hourly wages shrink since 1978. . . . Even when
employed, working-class men today often earn less than their fathers . . . . Today’s
working class men were born a generation too late. Their fathers could, with
luck, deliver the basic accouterments of middle-class life—the house, the car, the
washing machine. Today they can’t.
Id. at 29.
86. At least with regard to gender, Williams’ data show that: “The best bluecollar jobs, in precision, production, and craft occupations, have the largest
concentration of white males of any job category. White females hold only 2.1
percent of such jobs. Black women hold about 2.2 percent.” Id. at 76 (footnote
omitted).
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should be able to support his wife and kids. But that’s not the way
it is these days, is it? Well, I guess those rich guys can, but not some
87
ordinary Joe like me.”

Thus the economics of gender (here, economic definitions of
masculinity) complicate pre-existing race/class tensions.
Working class white men are only now experiencing the pressures
that men of color have long suffered. In addition to the above labor
and economic dynamics, many men of color can’t achieve
domesticity’s norm of the breadwinning ideal worker because of
discrimination.
The situation is particularly acute for African-American men. From
emancipation on, a key way of effecting white supremacy has been
to cut black men off from steady work. This pattern continues up
to the present: the earnings of black men are only two-thirds those
of white men, and the gap between black and white men’s earnings
has widened significantly since 1979. Black men’s relative inability
to get good, steady jobs often bars them from the provider role that
provides the conventional basis for male dignity.
To the
(significant) extent that racial prejudice cuts men of color off from
good jobs, they experience the hidden injuries of class in ways that
88
are linked with race and ethnicity.

Following the work of many insightful feminists of color, Williams
notes that to many black families, domesticity does not symbolize a
capitulation to patriarchy. Instead, they see it as active resistance to
racist assaults on the black family. Following slavery, as whites and
blacks wrestled over black women’s on-going role as field workers,
“gender remained a battleground in the struggle over whether blacks
were full people.”89 For many blacks today, “respectability” is an
important signal of racial dignity.90 Adherence to domesticity
87. Id. at 153. Williams also notes how blue-collar women’s market work has
itself resulted in more gender equity in their households, which often results in
family conflict, but also challenges domesticity. See id. at 29-30.
88. See id. at 30.
89. Id. at 165.
In view of the symbolic and material dimensions of slaves’ exclusion from
domesticity and stable family life, it is hardly surprising that once slavery was
abolished, freedmen not only married but also placed high priority on
withdrawing wives from field work. . . . Former masters belittled freedmen’s
attempts to claim for black women a “true womanhood,” which whites saw as
appropriate only for white women.
Id. See generally Davis, supra note 36; Katherine Franke, Becoming a Citizen:
Reconstruction Era Regulation of African American Marriages, 11 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 251
(1999); see also AMY DRU STANLEY, FROM BONDAGE TO C ONTRACT: WAGE LABOR,
M ARRIAGE, AND THE M ARKET IN THE AGE OF SLAVE EMANCIPATION 23-45 (1988)
(describing rhetoric of enslaved women, marriage, and domesticity in abolitionist
rhetoric).
90. See, e.g., RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 17-21 (1997)

FOREWORDPP. DOC

2000]

6/18/2001 12:11 PM

FOREWORD

845

remains a primary way to achieve such respectability.
Earlier, I summarized how the endorsement of ideal worker
strategies achieved by market-based solutions could alienate many
groups of women from feminism. In addition, when viewed through
the lens of masculinity, feminism’s assault on domesticity also is offputting. The “image of men as oppressors reflects a view held by the
partners of privileged men; less privileged women are more likely to
see their men as vulnerable and in need of solidarity.”91 In the
economic arena, men of color and working class men typically are
not viewed as “the enemy.”92 While women in these communities may
be actively resisting patriarchy, they often will be alienated by an
undifferentiated economic critique generated by feminism.93 While
“anxiety [has become] a permanent feature of masculinity,” class and
race may intensify it in ways feminists need to attend to.94 Through
complex analysis, Unbending Gender shows how responses to
domesticity that encompass only attack or market-based solutions
generate both class and race tensions which are articulated through
the rhetoric of gender wars and gender anxieties that are expressed
through race and class anger. Both solutions cripple efforts to build
feminist coalitions to solve work/family conflict.
One of the insights that this conclusion yields is that, even as
gender theory sheds light on work/family conflict, so viewing gender
through the lens of its economic meanings also complicates feminist
perspectives on the social construction of masculinity and femininity
and sexual desire.
As we begin sustained investigation into
work/family conflict as a site of gender production, we might learn
much from comparing it to the sex/violence system of gender
production. In many ways, the pull of gender in these economic
encounters may be more subtle. Williams contests:
(examining the “politics of respectability” within the African American community);
see also CLAUDIA TATE, D OMESTIC ALLEGORIES OF POLITICAL DESIRE: THE BLACK
HEROINE’ S TEXT AT THE TURN OF THE CENTURY (1992) (discussing how African
American women writers of the late 1800s used stories of “ideal domesticity” to
promote the advancement of their race).
91. UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 7, at 150-51.
92. See id. at 169-72.
93. See, e.g., id. at 171 (stating that African American feminists use a different
approach than traditional feminists when demanding equality). In my own
experience, black women, feminist-identified or not, are much more likely to express
criticism of black men for behavior that is gendered along the axis of sex rather than
economics, e.g., sexual abuse, exploitation, infidelity, emotional capacity, black
“machismo,” sensitivity, etc. When describing the economics of gender exploitation,
like white women, black women emphasize their position in comparison to white
men. For black feminists, when focusing on the economics of gender, it is typically
not the men of their own community who are identified as the problem.
94. See id. at 26.
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Gender power may well feel like men with their feet on our necks
in the context of rape, domestic violence, and sexual harassment,
but in the work/family context it more often feels like a force field
pulling women into traditionally feminine roles by making them
95
implausible in traditionally masculine ones.

Exploring the economic production of gender will also enrich
understanding of how the erotics of economics emerge and
function.96
Also, the sex/violence axis emphasizes how gender unites women.97
Engaging gender in its economic meanings requires considering how
gender divides women: working mothers versus stay-at-home mothers
(or mothers who wish they could stay at home); those who hire others
to care for their children and those who care for those children while
their own receive lesser care; differing norms of visions of the home
as a “gender factory of oppression” versus visions of the home as a
haven from a racist or capitalist world. In all of these contexts,
women find themselves at odds with each other as well as men,
negotiated through gender discourse.
One of the strengths of Unbending Gender is its attention to rhetoric
and discursive structures. Williams identifies several debates that
have fallen into a discursive loop. One of the most significant
interventions is into the sameness/difference debates. She offers rich
(and fair) descriptions of special treatment and formal equality
feminists, reconsidering and linking key debates that previously had
been viewed through discrete lenses. Unbending Gender posits what
Williams calls “reconstructive feminism,” which self-consciously builds
on earlier models.98 She envisions feminism evolving into a language
95. Id. at 248. Understanding the economic aspects of masculinity and
femininity also yields insights into the nature of desire itself—why masculine sexiness
even today is so often linked with market success.
96. See, e.g., id. at 128 (describing how the desirability of women in a marriage
may decline as they get older whereas the desirability of men increases because of
men’s acquisition of wealth at an older age).
As Lloyd Cohen puts it, “[W]omen in general are of relatively higher value as
wives at younger ages and depreciate much more rapidly than do men,” in large
part because “physical beauty and sexual attractiveness of women, while subjective
in nature, is a sharply inverse function of age.” Feminists would agree, although
they attribute this phenomenon to the fact that different things are eroticized in
men. This practice increases the desirability of successful older men while
decreasing the desirability of their wives. Statistics show that men in general find
it easier to remarry than do women; successful men probably enjoy even greater
comparative advantages.
Id.
97. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (illustrating how women share similar
sentiments on the issue of violence).
98. “From sameness feminism it draws its vision of equal parenting; from
difference feminism it draws its respect for family work.” See UNBENDING GENDER,
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of persuasion. “The twin goals of reconstructive feminism are to use
domesticity in strategic and self-conscious ways to destabilize it from
within.”99 Rather than attack domesticity, she investigates its potential
rhetorical power, and concludes feminists should endorse
“domesticity in drag.”100 These insights and arguments are
provocative, and will stimulate much debate in the feminist
community.
Throughout Unbending Gender, Williams makes arguments to
challenge and resolve work/family conflict in ways that are beneficial
to women, men, and children. She starts by inviting public debate
about appropriate norms of market and family work.
We need to open a debate on how much parental care children
truly need given the trade-off between providing money and
providing care. A good place to start is with the consensus that
children are not best served if both parents are away from home
eleven hours a day. This means that the jobs that require fifty-hour
workweeks are designed in a way that conflicts with the norm of
101
parental care.

Unbending Gender challenges the ideal worker standard from the
“market-side” and the “family-side.” First, she shows how Title VII
and other workplace law should construe the ideal worker standard
as sex discrimination.102 Similarly, she offers recommendations for
reform of divorce law.103 Finally, she confronts commodification
anxiety head on.104 She argues that feminists ought to take a fresh
look at commodification and its potential effects.105 Williams’ goals
supra note 7, at 141 (footnote omitted).
99. Id. at 198.
100. Id. at 198-99.
101. Id. at 53.
102. See id. at 101.
Domesticity’s organization of market and family work leaves women with two
alternatives. They can perform as ideal workers without the flow of family work
and other privileges male ideal workers enjoy. That is not equality. Or they can
take dead-end mommy-track jobs or “women’s work.” That is not equality either.
A system that allows only these two alternatives is one that discriminates against
women.
Id. at 39. She asserts that “[a]n effective test for whether a flexible policy
marginalizes the workers who use it is to see whether men as well as mothers use it,
for virtually no men will use policies that offer flexibility at the price of
marginalization.” Id. at 275.
103. “Once family work is acknowledged as work, a new rationale emerges for
income sharing after divorce: An asset produced by two people should be jointly
owned by them.” Id. at 125.
104. “The issue is not over whether the family wage will be owned, but over who
shall own it.” Id. at 132 (emphasis added).
105. Williams argues that
the legal literature on commodification rarely notes that women’s key problem
has been too little commodification, not too much.
While too much
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for reform are admirable if ambitious; she argues “a system of
restructured work would yield children raised by two parents, rather
than by an overburdened and absent father and a marginalized and
economically vulnerable mother.”106
This Symposium was convened to consider Unbending Gender’s
description of the economic meanings of gender and the
implications of its proposals. We convened three roundtable
sessions, each designed to address a particular aspect of the
economics of gender. The first session, “Redesigning Paid Work and
the Benefits Related to It,” takes on Williams’ notion of the ideal
worker. Participants in this session argued about the normativity of
the ideal worker, thus expanding the discussion beyond the
workplace and into the structure of social benefits and the tax code.
This roundtable squarely confronted Williams’ paradigm: choice or
discrimination? (Or something else entirely?) Should feminists
permit choice to appear as the showstopper it is in liberal theory?
Participants engaged the class dimensions of work/family conflict,
often disagreeing about their manifestations and sources.
Participants also debated whether domesticity is an accurate and
helpful description of work/family conflict and whether it has
continued into the twentieth century, albeit in the different form
posited by Unbending Gender.
The second session, entitled “Who’s Minding the Baby,” turned
our attention to how working women and families grapple with child
care needs. Participants vigorously debated where feminists should
focus their energies. Some disagreed with Williams’ proposals,
arguing that work/family conflict ineluctably follows from the
political decision to privatize dependency; once the burden of
caretaking is shifted to the family, then by default women
disproportionately will take on care-giving work. They argued that
feminists should emphasize changing the relationship of the family to
the state. More moderate reforms would merely make socialist
subsidies less feasible and act as a palliative, thereby “skimming” elite
women and leaving feminists politically weakened. Some members of
the audience felt strongly that feminists should continue to endorse
the delegation of childcare to the market. Participants also identified
and compared the strategies that different class and racial groups use
commodification has the potential for harm, so does too little: women’s historic
poverty stems in significant part from the way successive legal regimes have turned
their labor into love, leaving property the province of men.
Id. at 118 (footnote omitted).
106. Id. at 100.
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to resolve work/family conflict. Of particular interest were the rich
variations they noted in the very language used to describe the
conflict. Participants also were asked to consider Willliams’ argument
that communities of color respect family work as important political
work to sustain community and shield children from racism versus
the mainstream feminist representation of the gender factory.
Finally, the third roundtable session considered how an analysis of
the economics of gender fits within feminist legal theory more
broadly. This contentious session tackled the methodological and
ideological commitments feminists should be undertaking in the
twenty-first century. Panelists raised questions about the relationship
of feminism to what I call “market logic”: Should feminists utilize law
and economics?; Is the ideal worker inevitable in late capitalism?;
Ought feminists take account of profits in our critiques? Panelists
also debated the dangers and advantages of commodifying women’s
domestic work and whether there should there be a single feminist
approach to commodification (and if so, what might that be).
Finally, the panel debated the normativity in feminist theory of what
Martha Fineman calls the sexual family. Some argued that there was
the tension between Williams’ assumption that the heterosexual
family is a social and economic norm and destabilizing that same
family. Relatedly, concerns were expressed about the normativity of
child rearing itself. This lead to the larger issue for feminist theory
about whether using children’s welfare to argue for women’s equality
retreats from asserting that women’s welfare should be defended on
its own terms. Also, might such rhetoric alienate feminists who have
chosen to be childless? Both of these implicate whether feminists
should be trying to re-socialize gender roles. This implication leads
to the larger goal of the Gender, Work & Family Project and this
Symposium—to consider how gender might appear more complex
when filtered through both the axis of feminist work linking sexual
desire and social power and the axis stressing the economics of
gender.

